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Quantum Theories of Consciousness
Imants Barušs
King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario
The assumption is often made in conventional cognitive science that consciousness is a computational process resulting from macroscopic neural activity as described by classical physics. That assumption has been questioned both because it has been unsuccessful in explaining
consciousness and because it is based on outdated ideas about the nature of matter. More
contemporary quantum theories may be more successful for understanding cognition. For
example, Mari Jibu, Kunio Yasue, and Yasushi Takahashi have proposed a theory of memory
as a spinor ﬁeld underlying cortical dipoles in which quantum mechanical tunnelling instantiates memory decay and in which the creation of Goldstone bosons is the process of memory
recall. Or, more radically, as proposed by Eugene Wigner, consciousness itself could be a causal
agent that collapses the state vector describing physical reality. For Evan Harris Walker, such
an eﬀect occurs at synapses in the brain thereby regulating its electrochemical activity. According to Henry Stapp, Jeﬀrey Schwartz, and Mario Beauregard it is the attention density of
our ongoing experiential stream that modulates neural activity through the quantum Zeno
eﬀect with demonstrated implications for the treatment of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
Such ideas address the possibility of the existence of a pre-physical substrate, akin to David
Bohm=s implicate order, which could also be the referent of the transcendent consciousness
experienced by John Wren-Lewis and Franklin Wolﬀ. The notion of a deep consciousness as a
pre-physical substrate from which physical reality is precipitated is one way in which some of
the ideas of the theorists presented here could be integrated. It would be worth pursuing this
line of investigation to determine eventually the goodness of ﬁt of the resultant theories with
observational data.3
Keywords: Consciousness, quantum theories, cognition.

Motivation for Quantum Theories
Why should we consider quantum theories of consciousness? There are a couple
of reasons. The ﬁrst is the failure of classical computationalism to adequately explain
cognition and, in particular, consciousness. By “classical computationalism” I am referring to standard computer analogue and connectionist models of cognition (e.g.,
Pylyshyn, 1986). These models have some value as metaphors, just as the psychodynamic conceptualization of the psyche as a hydraulic system or the behaviourist telephone switchboard have their usefulness. But intractable problems arise when these
metaphors are taken seriously as actual explanations of reality. These problems have
always existed (e.g., Barwise, 1986), but have become more obvious with time. As Jerry
Fodor (2000) has said: “I would have thought that the last forty or ﬁfty years have
demonstrated pretty clearly that there are aspects of higher mental processes into
3

Author’s note. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Imants Barušs,
e-mail: baruss@uwo.ca
© 2006 Imants Barušs

39

Imants Barušs

which the current armamentarium of computational models, theories, and experimental techniques oﬀers vanishingly little insight” (p. 2). In my case, over the course of
more than a decade of carefully analysing them, I have found computational theories
of consciousness to be so riddled with lacunae (e.g., Barušs, 1990a; 1990b; 1992; 1995;
1998) that I do not see any hope for them in the near future and have stopped paying
attention to them. The point is that we need a good alternative to computationalism.
The second reason why we should consider quantum theories of consciousness
has to do with grounding our understanding of the psyche in the best theories of
physical reality. We need to understand the biological substrate of cognition, as, indeed, we try to do in neuroscience. But as Patricia Churchland (1980) has said: “For
purists, the real bottom will of course belong not to neuroscience but to physics” (p.
207). Well, I am certainly a purist and welcome the role of physics in explanations of
consciousness. However, “until recently, virtually all attempts to understand the functional activity of the brain have been based, at least implicitly, on some principles of
classical physics that have been known to be fundamentally false for three-quarters
of a century” (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard, 2005, p. 1310). Neuroscientiﬁc theories
based solely on classical physics are bound to fail because they do not take into account the occurrence of quantum phenomena. For this we need quantum theory.
As Jibu and Yasue (2004) have pointed out: “It seems of much importance now to let
the neuro- and cognitive scientists know the truth: it is necessary to rely on quantum theory . . .” (p. 287) and “incorporation of quantum theory into the investigation of brain functioning is an inevitable turning point of the consciousness research”
(p. 288). Thus, it is necessary to consider quantum processes in any theory of cognition.
Relinquishing traditional computational theories and embracing quantum theories of cognition leads to a shift in the level of physical reality at which mental events
can be thought of as taking place. Rather than emerging as a byproduct of cellular
activity, mentation can be viewed as occurring within the molecules constituting biological organisms. In particular, consciousness, as an experiential stream, could be a
phenomenon associated with subatomic events. Furthermore, consciousness could be
inextricably interwoven into the fabric of physical reality in essential ways.

Condensation Theories
One way of thinking about mentation as a quantum process is to associate it
with Fröhlich’s Bose-Einstein-like condensation. When a boson gas, such as a dilute
gas of rubidium atoms, is cooled suﬃciently, it undergoes a phase transition whereby
the condensed bosons collectively fall into their lowest possible energy states. The
resulting condensate is an ordered state in which the condensed particles behave in a
coordinated manner (cf. Annett, 2004; Daintith, 2005). Something similar occurs in a
biological system. According to Herbert Fröhlich, if energy is supplied to oscillating
electrical dipoles, such as “protein molecules or parts of cell walls,” (Marshall, 1989, p.
80) some of that energy will go into the “lowest collective frequency mode” (p. 79) of
the oscillators. Because of the properties of matter at the subatomic scale, the eﬀect
that this would have would be that of creating greater coherence between the separate
parts of that biological system.
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Mari Jibu, Yasushi Takahashi, and Kunio Yasue used these types of ideas to try to
account for memory. For Jibu et al., proteins surrounded by water in the brain constitute a system of “corticons” which can go into an ordered state known as a “spinor
ﬁeld.” Incoming energy, gated through interactions with classical constituents of a cell,
is a source of data for the corticons which then encode that information through a
phase transition until such time as it decays through quantum mechanical tunnelling.
Memory retrieval occurs when a signal similar to the encoded information prompts
recall through the creation of Goldstone bosons (Jibu & Yasue, 2004; Takahashi &
Jibu, 2004). Quantum mechanical tunnelling is a process whereby subatomic particles
can escape energy barriers that would not be possible to transcend through classical
means (cf. Goswami, 1997/2003), whereas Goldstone bosons are massless particles
created in conditions such as those considered by Jibu et al. (Daintith, 2005; Sudbery,
1986). Although some of the details of this theory need clariﬁcation, it does suggest a
way in which memory could be encoded in the quantum states of electrical dipoles in
the brain rather than being a function of cellular biochemistry.

Collapse Theories
Before it is observed, there is no single state in which physical reality exists. Rather, there is a superposition of possible physical realities whose description is called the
“state vector.” At the time of observation, one of the possibilities becomes the physical reality that is actually experienced. All of the other possibilities either disappear
or continue on their own trajectories as alternate physical realities, depending upon
one’s point of view. Or, as some physicists have posited, environmental eﬀects introduce “decoherence” that erases some of the possibilities, although it does not appear as
though all of them can be thus made to vanish (Adler, 2003). If the alternate realities
are believed to disappear entirely in addition to any decoherence eﬀects, then the state
vector is said to have “collapsed.” The problem, known as the “measurement problem,”
becomes that of determining the cause of the collapse.
One solution to the measurement problem has been to say that consciousness,
acting as a non-physical source of intervention, causes the collapse of the state vector.
This was the position taken, for example, by Eugene Wigner (1972): “. . . the ‘reduction
of the wave packet’ . . . takes place whenever the result of an observation enters the
consciousness of the observer or, to be even more painfully precise, my own consciousness, since I am the only observer, all other people being only subjects of my
observations” (p. 137). However, if we are going to go down this road, then it makes
sense to separate out two aspects of measurement, namely one which notes the eﬀects
of the collapse of the state vector and the other which triggers the collapse. And so
consciousness can be thought of as having both an observational capacity and a volitional agency (Barušs, 1986). Evan Harris Walker (2000) has also, in eﬀect, made this
distinction, noting that it is the will which causes the collapse of the state vector.
Walker (1970; 1977; 2000) has said that the exercise of the will to collapse the state
vector occurs, in particular, at synapses between nerve cells, resulting in modulation of
electrochemical communication processes taking place in the brain. An electrochemical impulse arriving at a synapse creates an electrical potential across the synaptic cleft
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leading to quantum mechanical tunnelling of electrons from postsynaptic to presynaptic structures. According to Walker, the tunnelling electrons induce conformational
changes to presynaptic macromolecules thereby triggering the release of neurotransmitter. Walker has postulated that these eﬀects are propagated throughout the brain by
“hopping conduction” along ribonucleic acid molecules (Walker, 2000, p. 229). Because
all of the electrons involved in this process are indistinguishable, the tunnelling and
propagation of these electrons can be regarded as the activity of a single electron, thereby producing the kind of coordinated activity necessary to account for the nature of
consciousness. For Walker, “consciousness is the collection of potentialities that develop
as these electrons and these structures of the brain interact” (p. 237). Will, by causing the
state vector to collapse in a particular manner, initiates this electron cascade, thereby selecting which synapses will ﬁre and, hence, determining our experience and behaviour.
Henry Stapp, together with some colleagues, has developed a similar idea. For
Stapp, when we talk about consciousness collapsing the state vector, we are talking
about the inﬂuence of our ongoing subjective stream of consciousness. The example
that Stapp has used is that of raising one’s arm. I think I would like to raise my arm and
then my arm goes up. In this manner we have mental causation. The evidence to substantiate such a causal notion of volition comes from Jeﬀrey Schwartz’s brain-imaging
studies of “self-directed neuroplasticity,” whereby changes to the right caudate nucleus
were found after ten weeks of cognitive-behavioural therapy for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Furthermore, he found that “dispassionate self-observation” appeared
to be a critical aspect of the cognitive treatment for it to be eﬀective (Schwartz, 2005;
Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Of course, one’s experience of volition could be after the fact
since the brain’s cybernetics operating through more conventionally conceptualized
physiological processes could be the causal agents also in cases of neuroplasticity.
Stapp et al. call on a quantum phenomenon known as the “quantum Zeno eﬀect”
to suggest a mechanism for wilful action. Closely spaced repeated observational acts
can hold a quantum system in a constant state even if there is pressure through classical mechanisms for it to change. They suggest that what happens is that, as we increase
the amount of mental eﬀort, we increase the rapidity with which the selection of alternatives occurs. For Stapp et al., “oscillating states of macroscopic subsystems of the
brain” (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard, 2005, p. 1320; emphases removed) acting in a
widespread coherent manner instantiate the intended actions, thereby modulating the
electrochemical neural activity of the brain. In practical terms, then, eﬀort can hold
in place a “template for action” (p. 1324; emphases removed) by increasing the density
of attention so that an intended action has a higher probability of occurrence than
it otherwise would. It should be noted that the quantum Zeno eﬀect, which has been
observed experimentally outside the context of mind-body interaction, is considered
by some physicists to be, not an eﬀect of consciousness during an observational process, but a decoherence eﬀect (e.g., Polkinghorne, 2002).

The Notion of a Pre-Physical Substrate
With these collapse theories of consciousness, what we have essentially, is the notion of a pre-physical substrate from which causal eﬀects on physical reality can emerge.
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But there has been a more radical notion in quantum theory outside the context of
consciousness studies, namely, that physical reality as such emerges from a pre-physical
substrate. And this applies not just to physical bodies, but to physical space itself, within
which physical bodies are situated. For example: “. . . space is no longer the all-embracing
theatre of reality, but a structure that has emerged together with the macroscopic material entities that have emerged from the microworld” (Aerts & Aerts, 2005, p. 153).
David Bohm has used the notion of an “implicate order” to conceptualize a prephysical substrate (Bohm, 1980/1983; Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Factor, 1985). His ideas
can be illustrated with the following analogy. One of the physical phenomena that is
predicted by quantum mechanics but whose existence is not possible within classical
physics, is that of entanglement. In some cases, subatomic processes remain connected
in non-local ways. For example, under some conditions, a photon moving away from
another in the opposite direction from it can nonetheless behave in such a manner
as to “take into account” the activity of the distant photon. Bohm has used the example of ﬁsh in a tank to discuss such quantum entanglement: Imagine two images
taken with two separate cameras, from two diﬀerent angles, of a single ﬁsh, projected
onto two separate television screens. How is it that the ﬁsh on the second screen can
so perfectly copy what the ﬁsh on the ﬁrst screen does? Well, it is not at all unusual
since they are both images of the same ﬁsh. In the same way “... we may regard each
of the ‘particles‘constituting a system as a projection of a ‘higher-dimensional’ reality”
(Bohm, 1980/1983, p. 188). According to Bohm, what we experience, our consciousness as well as the physical world, is an explication of an implicate order.
The notion of a pre-physical substrate is also found in some cases of alterations
of consciousness. For example, following an opiate-induced coma, John Wren-Lewis
(1994) felt that “some kind of brain-cataract [had been] removed, making unobscured
perception possible for the ﬁrst time” (p. 109). Upon examination of his experience,
he found a “dazzling darkness” (p. 109) underlying his ordinary consciousness that
was so palpable that it seemed as though the back of his head were exposed to the
inﬁnite reaches of space. This underlying darkness gave rise to the physical world so
that: “... what I perceive with my eyes and other senses is a whole world that seems to
be coming fresh-minted into existence moment by moment ...” (Wren-Lewis, 1988, p.
116). Similarly, following his experience of enlightenment, Franklin Wolﬀ has maintained that our subject-object experience of reality arises from a generative underlying substrate. In fact, for Wolﬀ, “... consciousness is itself the substantial substrate ...”
(Merrell-Wolﬀ, 1995, p. 195).
I agree with Wolﬀ, in that I think that the pre-physical substrate has the quality of
consciousness. Not consciousness in the sense of an ongoing experiential stream, but
“deep consciousness” as a normally inaccessible aspect of our psyches of which our
ordinary consciousness is a byproduct. This is consistent with Amit Goswami‘s (1993)
contention that “... our consciousness is the consciousness of the Being that is beyond
the subject-object split” (p. 187; emphases removed). Thus it is possible that such “...
non-local consciousness... collapses the brain-mind from outside space-time...” (Goswami, 1993, p. 186). In such a quantum theory of consciousness, it is not that quantum
theory explains consciousness, but rather that quantum theory allows for the understanding of a possible relationship of consciousness to physical matter.
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I think that consciousness, in the sense of deep consciousness as a pre-physical
substrate, analogous to the implicate order, could be giving rise to space-time with its
constituent corporeality. Intentions within one‘s experiential stream, as aspects of the
deeper consciousness, perhaps actualized as a coherent subatomic system through
Fröhlich‘s Bose-Einstein-like condensation, could aﬀect physical reality by directing
the collapse of the state vector at synapses, thereby modulating the electrochemical
activity of neurons. In this way, some of the ideas of the theorists presented here could
be integrated. It would be worth pursuing this line of investigation to determine eventually the goodness of ﬁt of the resultant theories with observational data.
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